Tractinsky advances the idea that we need a stronger scientific HCI focused on better understanding of constructs like usability along with its constituent components. Doing so, he argues, might also help to provide HCI practitioners 2 with better, more reliable methods to move forward and develop their own work. One option here would be in better "explicating the relations between design choices and design outcomes and getting rid of a confounding usability construct" (p. 49). Such an improvement to the theoretical landscape of HCI, he argues, is connected to and would support corresponding advances in the practical work of designing interactive systems by practitioners.
ARE WE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME "USABILITY"?
I want us to be a bit more careful about what we mean when we say "usability" here. To start, I think I can agree the following: Usability certainly seems to be a problem when we speak of it in terms of a scientific version of HCI, as Tractinsky ably documents. However, this argument relies on a very particular conception of disciplinary knowledge formation in HCI that is not necessarily uniformly agreed upon within its cross-cutting communities. Although I would personally prefer to exercise quite significant caution around the idea of "scientizing" HCI, that particular issue is not the topic of this commentary (I have addressed it elsewhere; see Reeves, 2015a Reeves, , 2015b .
Instead my interest is in the following. Elements of Tractinsky's argument seem to rely on ideas of a seamlessness between the concerns of HCI research and practitioners' work. Now, it's true of course that a focal issue for practitioners is most definitely usability (perhaps ostensibly). This is testified to by the persistent popularity of perhaps the most clear manifestation, usability testing, which remains a key part of user research even as design remit for practitioners has (at least in the discourse of practice) expanded well beyond "usability." But having spent time observing practitioners at work performing usability testing, I am left wondering if usability-in-practice really is a "problem." In other words, although usability may present itself as a problematic matter on a conceptual level to Tractinsky's sense of scientific HCI, I find it hard to locate any similar order of conceptual trouble encountered by practitioners in their work practices.
3 To explain this another way, conceptual troubles about usability do not seem to be topicalized during testing (as far as I can tell). This is not to suggest an absence of debate about usability and usability testing practices and indeed best practices among practitioners of various stripes; on the contrary, there are frequent and lively debates about topics such as how many users count as "enough" (Nielsen & Landauer, 1993) , how much moderators should intervene, to what degree participants should perform think-aloud, and the differences between remote and local testing (to name a few). But these are fundamentally not conceptual debates akin to that described by Tractinsky.
To say it differently again, I'm simply suggesting that the nature of problems faced by practitioners is not necessarily the same as those faced in academic excursions to addressing usability (an observation that, surely, is hardly controversial). Case in point: Usability cannot be that much of a mystery to many practitioners. As professionals during usability testing, practitioners-UXers, designers, client stakeholders, developers, product managers, and so on-routinely go about identifying "this" aspect or "that" aspect of (observed or inspected) use and formulate (and agree upon) these as usability problems in the course of their activities. Of course none of this is to suggest that identifying usability problems is somehow uncomplicated or that perhaps the existence, priority, or importance of identified problems is uncontested. Rather, my point is that although techniques like usability testing do indeed benefit from experience and manicured technical and "soft" skills, locating usability problems in the collective courses of work of practitioners is not a vexed matter at some conceptual or fundamental level or subject to the kind of serious and quite fundamental intellectual disagreement documented in the HCI research literature and pointed to by Tractinsky. In contrast, practitioners' lab testing largely takes place in an orderly fashion; production of usability findings follow; designers, developers, managers, and so on, act upon findings; and improvements to products are made (and evaluated in some way, e.g., Key Performance Indicators or Return On Investment models, for instance, as noted in Tractinsky's article, p. 49). In sum it's quite hard to see similar conceptual crises within the pragmatics of this kind of work to that laid out in "The Usability Construct: A Dead End?" Why might this be? On one level, it is probably the case that what is at stake differs between different uses of and senses in which we say "usability": For practitioners, usability is lodged in the context of material changes to products that result in improved product outcomes (in some way), whereas for academic, HCIscientific senses of usability, the stakes are located in pursuit of academic outcomes such as research papers, "contributions to knowledge," continuation of research funding, and so forth. Immediately then we see that our discussion of "usability" needs to tread carefully to avoid category mistakes, that is, confusing one sense of usability for another as just described.
FORMAL ACCOUNTS OF USABILITY AND USABILITY IN VIVO
Earlier I made an initial foray into the idea of a dissonance in thinking about usability as a problem. Here I want to expand this to think about related aspects that benefit from being thrown into relief.
Specifically, I think there are differences between formal accounts of usability and the ways in which usability is lodged in practice. By formal accounts I mean definitions of usability that we find in research literature including in this article; sometimes these might be described as "theory." Tractinsky's article is ultimately a review of these formal accounts and the ways in which they fail to reach agreement on what usability is. Disagreement spans usability's constituent elements (like effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction as per ISO 9241-11) and causal relations between those elements (e.g., that "usability is not simply an attribute of the product, but is also a context-dependent quality"; Tractinsky, p. 21). We also need to remind ourselves that formal accounts are of course not exclusive to academic research; for instance, there are plenty of practitioners' own articulations of usability, centered primarily around testing (e.g., see those of Krug, 2009 , or Kuniavsky, 2003 .
The distinction here is that formal accounts (necessarily) contrast with what we might call in vivo, practical orientations to usability, like those that might be found in actual sites of work where usability becomes a foremost practical concern-usability testing as I just described being one such location. In these, usability is something to be discovered. Usability must come to be constituted as recognizable and reportable things for practitioners via "situated practices of looking-and-telling" (Garfinkel, 1967 , p. 1)-as sharedly objective 4 matters agreed upon between practitioners in the course of their examinations of prototypes, competitor products, or any other relevant artifact under inspection. It is not that formal accounts of usability are somehow irrelevant here, but rather their relationship is more complex, standing in as resources that orient and shape-but do not constitute-what counts as usability.
Expanding this last point, usability-in-practice cannot necessarily be readily, formally specified beforehand. This is perhaps one of the key reasons for actually even doing usability testing, where troubles-in-use unfold as identifiable socially shared objects, "filled in" by the interactional work of moderators and test participants. Although many of these troubles follow paths that are familiar to moderators and perhaps others observing (e.g., participants cannot work out what to do next), they are always contingent on local exigencies. In other words this is a sense of usability as discovered interactionally 5 through the concrete, concerted, organized actions of participants, moderators, observers, stakeholders, and so on, that are done during a test, rather than as a priori, theorized sets of usability criteria. As the process of testing develops from one moment to the next, moderators and observers must do interactional work to transform the stream of test "happenings" into noticeable cases of usability issues.
6 This is not trivial, of course: Some problems visibly encountered by test participants may not be relevant for a wide range of reasons even though they seem to be possible usability troubles (in which case, do they then "count" as usability issues at all?).
Overall it's not clear if the umbrella construct takes such a distinction into account at all-rather, it seems geared to managing conceptual development entirely within academic discourse and not much of the lived work of usability. This is not a problem per se, but rather an oversight that could benefit from inspection, that is, research on the praxeology of usability as complement to the kind of formal development of usability as umbrella construct. This means that I think there are alternate (not alternative) perspectives on usability to be found embedded in the practices of practitioners, a sense of usability-in-practice that emerges from interactional phenomena themselves. It's perhaps in this sense that we might also look to see what usability means for them, as an autochthonous artifact of the concrete circumstances of practitioners' work.
